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Analysis of globalisation induced gains and losses necessitates not only new types of 
data to substitute for the ones compiled in traditional trade statistics but also new 
analytical approaches. This paper surveys the literature that addresses the evolution 
of the global value chain approach, an analytical perspective that is able to capture 
the causes and consequences of the ongoing process of global reorganisation of 
production more in depth than earlier theories. Our specific focus is on one hand, 
advanced economy actors’ changing activity specialisation in the new global division 
of labour and the related changes in their competitiveness, and on the other hand 
crisis-related changes in global value chains. We conjecture that advanced economy 
actors have been continuously shifting their specialisation towards ‘the edges of the 
value chains’ into activities requiring higher skills, and resulting in a higher value 
capture for them. We show that this process has further accelerated during the crisis. 
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Introduction 
 
Globalisation has brought about fundamental changes in the international division of labour 
thatare poorly traced using the available statistical data and methodological approaches 
(Sass, Fifekova, 2011). Case studies on the value distribution in products where global value 
chains (GVCs) link together stakeholders responsible for individual stages of value adding 
(e.g. Ali-Yrkkö et al., 2011; Dedrick et al., 2010) have managed to shed new light on long-
standing competitiveness puzzles and policy debates, concerned with the consequences of 
the long continuing decline in advanced economies’ share in world manufacturing production, 
coupled with their accumulating trade deficits in in high-technology manufacturing industries 
in particular. The recent phenomenon of the offshoring and offshore outsourcing of 
advanced, high value-adding activities to less developed countries (Contractor et al., 2010; 
Manning et al., 2008) has added fuel to ongoing policy debates. 
The concerns of developed economies’ regarding the adverse economic 
consequences of the apparently non-abating increase in the range and depth of offshored 
activities, which accelerated after the 2008−2011 crisis, can be contrasted with the puzzling 
fact that advanced economy manufacturing firms’ value added to production ratio keeps 
increasing (UNIDO International Yearbooks of Industrial Statistics). It is argued in this article 
that the answer to this puzzle lies in advanced economy manufacturing firms’ activity 
specialisation in the new global division of labour, which is strongly related to their robust and 
sometimes increasing value capture. This article focuses on changes in the GVC activities of 
advanced economies: how lead firms’ and advanced economies’ activity specialisation 
evolves in GVCs in tandem with offshoring and offshore outsourcing – a hitherto 
underinvestigated issue.  
The dynamics of the evolution of advanced economies’ activity specialisation was 
significantly influenced by the 2008-2011 crisis that provoked a sharp fall in foreign trade 
volumes: in fact, the extent of trade decrease was greater than the decline in output. Thus 
international trade can be regarded as one of the great ‘victims’ of the world crisis (Escaith et 
al., 2010). At the same time, it was one of the main channels through which the crisis was 
transmitted between countries. Our analysis brings together the two related perspectives: 
globalisation- and crisis-related changes in global value chains. Beginning with a summary of 
the analytical background, we present briefly the emergence and evolution of the GVC 
framework of analysis, and the trade-in-task perspective (section 2). This is followed by a 
survey of patterns of advanced-economy actors’ changing specialisation within GVCs 
(section 3). Section 4 focuses on crisis-induced transformations in GVCs and the implications 
thereof for advanced economies. Section 5 concludes. 
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The GVC framework of analysis  
 
In a holistic view of value creation, the concept of GVC refers to all (tangible and intangible) 
activities – carried out by geographically dispersed, networked economic actors – that 
contribute to the creation, sale and support the end use of a product or service. The GVC 
framework of analysis moves beyond merely scrutinising the distribution of production 
activities (and related flows of trade in intermediates) and investigates all the activities of 
firms’ value chains, including production-related support activities and activities that enhance 
the intangible value of products. Hence, the GVC framework incorporates and contributes to 
a better understanding of trade, not only in manufactures, but also in business services, a 
constituent of global trade whose volume is expanding at a significant rate (Gereffi and 
Fernandez-Stark, 2010).  
In contrast to trade-based analyses, the point of departure for scholars investigating 
the transformation of the global economy from an organisational perspective using firms and 
inter-firm networks as the central unit of analysis (Gereffi, 2005) is that the simple increases 
in the volume of integrative trade and in the geographical spread of economic activities 
cannot be regarded as the key feature of the recent global transformation. The key novelty is 
rather the functional integration of globally dispersed activities (Dicken, 2003).  
According to Baldwin (2006), globalisation and the slicing up of value chains 
proceeded in two waves. The first unbundling – ‘the end of the necessity of making goods 
close to the point of consumption’ (:7) – started with the technological advances of the first 
industrial revolution, which have led to the first dramatic fall in transportation costs and 
consequently to an explosion in trade. The recent wave of globalisation that started a couple 
of decades ago (in the 1980s) triggered the second unbundling: ‘the end of the need to 
perform most manufacturing stages near each other’ (:7), coupled with functional unbundling, 
facilitated by the information technology revolution.  
Scholars trying to extrapolate from recent trends (the point of departure being that 
technological advances have made production tasks increasingly separable, tradable, 
standardisable and offshorable, which has resulted in an ever finer division of labour) have 
predicted that global shifts in production will continue, and that, with a steady increase in the 
number of ‘footloose tasks’, with activities increasingly dispersed and to low-cost economies 
(Friedman, 2005). In fact, with digitisation, codification and modular product architecture, 
more tasks are becoming commoditised than ever before (Davenport, 2005; Manning et al., 
2012). The relocation of production is often followed by the relocation of certain R&D tasks 
4 
 
as well, in order to reduce the physical distance between R&D engineers and the operation, 
and to ‘ensure that problems are solved at source as they arise’ (Lanz et al., 2011, p. 4). 
As for the adverse effect of offshoring on developed economies, several scholars 
argue, that a careful distinction has to be made between contestable activities, which are 
bound to result in dispersion, and non-contestable activities, the geographical concentration 
of which is not reduced (Leamer, 2007). Given that these latter activities account for the 
dominant share of value added, this suggests that the competitiveness of advanced 
economies is not threatened by the increasing number of footloose activities.  
This debate and the recent puzzling manifestations of advanced economies' 
competitiveness prompted our main research question: we investigate the changing patterns 
of advanced economies’ specialisation in the current ‘world of outsourcing and offshoring’, in 
which ‘the boundaries of ... firms have ... simultaneously shrunk organizationally and 
expanded geographically’ (Contractor et al., 2010, p. 1418).  
Next we briefly discuss the emergence and evolution of the trade-in-tasks perspective 
– a recent methodological approach which allows precise insight into the patterns and 
dynamics of countries’ specialisation.  
 
Trade-in-tasks perspectives 
 
A far-reaching finding of early GVC scholars was that what matters for 
competitiveness is not what countries produce (the technology mix of production and export) 
and how their world trade share evolves, but rather the dynamics of exporters’ value capture, 
in other words how their share in the total value added of their export products evolves 
(Gereffi and Fernandez-Stark, 2011; Kaplinsky and Morris, 2001). Economic performance is 
determined by firms’ added value, which in turn shapes their value capture. GVC scholars 
started to measure companies’ move from low to high(er) value-adding activities by 
identifying generic business functions and gathering data on them (Sturgeon, 2008; Brown, 
2008; Sturgeon and Gereffi, 2009; Eurostati). 
In contrast to the implicit assumption of these scholars that both firms and countries 
increasingly become specialised in specific functions within GVCs, case study evidence 
suggests that several subsidiaries (as well as suppliers) host ‘identical’ business functions: 
support functions (administration, HR, finances, accounting, transportation, logistics, 
distribution, procurement, general management, customer support). In addition,  and those 
functions that pertain to the intangible constituents of the value chain, for example design, 
research and development, engineering, ICT services, knowledge-intensive software 
development are decentralised (Contractor et al. 2010; Pavlínek and Zenka, 2011; 
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Szalavetz, 2012; Winter, 2010). Although peripheral subsidiaries are seemingly entrusted 
with identical functions as headquarters, the activities related to the individual functions are 
far from being identical. There are large inter-subsidiary differences in the complexity and 
value-adding capability of individual business functions, given that business functions 
themselves can be sliced up. Business functions are decomposable and consist of dozens of 
sub-functions (Contractor et al., 2010). 
Lead firms can decide which sub-function is located and to which subsidiary. 
Empirical evidence suggests that, even in the case of advanced high value-adding activities, 
the slices (the tasks) that are offshored are less knowledge-intensive than the segments of 
the same business function that are kept in-house: these latter are the tasks that require non-
routine, cognitive and analytical competencies. Furthermore, with the organisational 
decomposability of business functions, no single function can be unambiguously described 
by simple dichotomies such as low-tech and labour-intensive and low value-adding; or 
advanced and knowledge-intensive and high value-adding.   
Decomposable as they are, broad business functions, as units of international trade 
analyses, give an incomplete and potentially misleading picture in cross-country 
comparisons. This deficiency called for an even finer level of trade analysis that takes 
account of the fact that the many kinds of activities related to specific business functions can 
be disaggregated, and that the ones that can be standardised, codified and routinized are 
increasingly offshored. 
Hence, it is the spatial distribution of corporate activities – or even the location of 
each value-adding act (Stehrer et al., 2011) – that should be examined, rather than the 
distribution of business functions. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) model trade as an 
exchange of identifiable and discrete units of work. This recognition motivated data 
compilation and analyses of trade at the task level (Lanz et al., 2011), an initiative that later 
developed into a joint OECD-WTO designed measurement framework and database of trade 
in value added (cf. WTO: Made in the World 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/statis_e/miwi_e/miwi_e.htm; see also: Maurer and Degain, 
2012). 
These new analytical approaches can compensate for the above-detailed deficiencies 
of business function-based analyses. Moreover, they contribute to a better understanding of 
the features that make specific activities offshorable: standardisation, codification, 
routinisation, skilled labour intensity, that is the degree to which it requires cognitive and 
analytical competencies (Autor et al., 2003) – note that these characteristics determine the 
added value of individual activities. 
 
The changing activity specialisation within GVCs of advanced economies  
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Analyses of countries’ specialisation are usually concerned with industry mixes by 
technology intensity, and with the drivers and competitiveness implications of changes in 
specialisation (Midelfart-Knavrik et al., 2002). Industry-level analyses associate the 
competitiveness of industries with the productive factors used most intensively in the given 
industry (Baldwin, 2011). This line of thinking has, however, left several questions 
unanswered, producing at the same time some hard-to-explain puzzles, such as the 
historical strength of the advanced economies of European low- and medium-tech (LMT) 
industries, and the remarkable stability of LMT sectors in terms of both employment and 
value added.ii 
A much debated issue was the relation between specialisation and macroeconomic 
performance, which above and beyond theory, has important policy implications. Despite 
extensive analytical and empirical efforts it remains ambiguous as to whether Europe's 
lagging growth and productivity performance (Dalum et al., 1999; Fagerberg et al., 2000; 
Sapir, 2004) can be ascribed to its traditional specialisation patterns. 
While some authors argued that traditional industry-level taxonomies (i.e. the 
classification of innovativeness along the ‘low-tech – high-tech’ spectrum) are misleading: 
non-science-based industries are also innovative, albeit on measures other than science-
based ones (Mendonça 2009; von Tunzelmann and Acha, 2005). The point of departure of 
another stream of research is more related to our investigations. Kirner et al., 2009; and 
Peneder, 2010 showed that no industry is internally homogeneous, rather each industry is 
composed of a wide variety of high-, medium- and low-tech firms. Low-technology industries 
are therefore not to be equated with low-technology firms, and conversely, high-tech 
industries also include a considerable number of non-innovative firms. Hence, ‘industry’ 
cannot be considered the appropriate level for competitiveness analyses. A related research 
strand argues that, as a consequence of widespread vertical specialisation (Hummels et al., 
2001), specialisation in high-tech exports does not necessarily reflect indigenous 
technological capabilities (Srholec, 2007). This is what explains large intra-GVC, cross-
country differences in value creation and value capture (Dedrick et al., 2010; Ali-Yrkkö et al., 
2011).  
These findings suggest that it is the industry-level distribution of activities (rather than 
the distribution of industries themselves) that determines competitiveness and sheds light on 
the real nature of specialisation. Baldwin (2006, 2011) asserts that in the current wave of 
globalisation, competition is manifest not at the level of sectors and industries (as in 
traditional trade theories), but rather at the level of individuals (and the tasks they perform). 
This recognition produced the most recent move in an ongoing process, in which the unit of 
analysis of international specialisation shifted to increasingly finer levels: from industries (and 
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industry-associated skill groups) to goods, from goods to intermediates (Stehrer et al., 2011), 
and most recently to business functions and to tasks (activities).  
Within the international business literature there is anecdotal evidence of various 
aspects of advanced-economy firms’ changing activity specialisation. One example is the 
transformation of manufacturing firms into service providers. In order to add value, increase 
profitability and withstand competition from low-cost producers, manufacturing companies try 
to integrate service provision into their manufacturing products (the ‘servitisation of products’ 
in Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988; Martinez et al., 2010) or to achieve convergence of 
manufacturing and services (Stehrer et al., 2012). They compete with business solutions 
(Prencipe et al., 2003), a combination of products, services networks and infrastructures, 
delivered as a system to the customer (Davies, 2004). Manufacturing firms are considered 
predominantly service providers once their revenues from service activities exceed revenues 
from products. A related concept is that of factory-less firms or hollow corporations: they 
specialise in activities such as design, brand management, marketing, logistics and retail, but 
outsource manufacturing (Dicken, 2011). 
The theoretical context underpinning these phenomena is Porter's (1986) assertion 
about the two dimensions of firms’ international competition: (i) coordination, and (ii) 
configuration of global activities. According to Hobday et al. (2005), systems integration is 
one of a lead firm’s core capabilities. However, the authors provide a narrow definition of 
systems integration, as bringing together ‘all the necessary inputs for a system ... high-
technology components, subsystems, software, skills, knowledge, engineers, managers, and 
technicians to produce a product...’ (Hobday et al., 2005:1110). By contrast, the trade-in-
tasks perspective of systems integration incorporates many other tasks in addition to the 
items listed above, for example support services, services incorporated into the products, 
and service types of corporate activities that enhance the intangible value of products. Since 
each of these latter activities can be sourced internationally, systems integration through the 
global configuration of activities and their coordination really can be regarded as lead firms’ 
core competence. Systems integration concerns configuring activities in an optimal way, in 
order to benefit from both of ‘the simultaneous “twin” processes of vertical integration and 
disintegration’ (:1111), from ‘both specialisation and integration’ (:1136).  
Recent research on firms’ critical capabilities (surveyed by Schmid and Schurig, 
2003) has also identified organisational and marketing-type capabilities as critical. These 
latter capabilities, above all that of systems integration – including the capability to (i) identify 
the core competences and determine the balance of vertical integration and specialisation, 
(ii) find the right suppliers (and geographical location), and manage and control the global 
sourcing process, (iii) integrate, coordinate and control distributed knowledge bases (Brusoni 
et al., 2001), and (iv) design and implement the global marketing and sales strategy – 
8 
 
complement firms’ technological and developmental capabilities, and are deemed critical for 
business success in general, and for value capture in particular. 
Considering Baldwin's (2012) taxonomy of 'headquarter economy', versus 'factory 
economy' advanced economies' specialisation concerns, and is increasingly restricted to the 
above type of core capabilities: to system integration and coordination. These activities are 
associated with the highest value added as demonstrated both by Mudambi’s (2008) and 
Baldwin’s (2012) theoretical model, the so-called smile curve economics and by the results of 
exercises that decompose the value-added shares of the individual constituents of intangible 
capital (Piekkola, 2011). According to Piekkola, it is organisational capital, i.e. activities that 
contribute to the generation of organisational capitaliii that can be associated with the highest 
value capture. The smile curve that depicts the distribution of value added at each stage of 
the chain (figure 1) illustrates this point. It makes obvious that production activities generate 
much less value added, than pre- and post-manufacturing services-type activities. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The specialisation of advanced economy firms in organisational capital-related activities and 
business functions is examined indirectly by a research strand concerned with the 
(re)location of multinational companies’ (divisional) headquarters (HQ). HQs are important 
sources of high-value-adding jobs, and they represent hubs of high-end business services 
concentrated around them. In addition, the most important managerial functions (decision-
making about the configuration of activities, coordination and corporate governance, global 
financial and strategic management, etc.) are concentrated in firms’ HQs, and consequently 
most organisational capital is associated with the HQ. It is therefore important to monitor 
changes in their spatial distribution. Despite the importance and the performance implications 
of the topic, data on this aspect are scarce and research has been confined mainly to 
identifying the motivations for, and the performance implications of HQ relocation (Birkinshaw 
et al., 2006; Laamanen et al., 2012; Strauss-Kahn and Vives, 2009). 
 
Crisis and GVCs: Catalyst or stabiliser of trade flows  
 
Advanced economies gradually evolving GVC-specialisation experienced a sudden 
exogenous shock with the economic and financial crisis that broke in 2008. In this section we 
first examine why the fall of international trade was greater than that of GDP. Our second 
question is whether (and how) foreign trade acted as a transmitter of the crisis. Finally we 
seek to answer, whether the crisis brought about changes in the level, extent and other 
characteristics of the participation of advanced economies in GVCs. 
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GVC-related factors were included as possible transmission mechanisms when 
investigating the causes of the trade decline (and especially its differing depth in various 
countries) and the role of international trade in ‘transporting’ the crisis from one country to 
another (see, among others, Baldwin, 2009; Freund, 2009; Milberg and Winkler, 2010). 
These authors hypothesised that it is the organisation of international production in GVCs 
that caused a greater drop in trade than in GDP. Baldwin (2009, 2011) actually suggested 
that GVCs played a key role in the nature of the ‘great trade collapse’. This meant that 
GVCs, a relatively neglected area of research up till then, have come to the forefront in terms 
of analysing changes in world trade during the crisis. The GVC approach proved to be fruitful 
in getting better insight into the anatomy of the crisis, in spite of that fact that as we will see, 
the results of empirical studies perceived as related to the GVC approach differ from each 
other.   
First it must be noted, that there are some empirical papers that do not find the GVC 
factor significant. For example, Rose and Spiegel (2010) could not find strong evidence that 
international trade linkages acted as transmitters of the crisis. According to their results, 
countries with higher exposure to the US economy (in terms of the share of their exports to 
the US) performed better during the crisis. Thus, trade linkages did not play a negative role in 
helping the crisis travel through countries. As for the main factors playing a role in the trade 
decline, other authors ( for example Chor and Manova, 2010) – found that adverse credit 
conditions played an important role in transmitting the impact of the crisis to trade flows. The 
dependence on external finance by French exporters is also underlined as the most 
important factor by Bricongne et al. (2011).  
Nevertheless, several empirical studies showed that factors connected to GVCs may 
have played a role in the significant decrease in foreign trade volumes during the crisis. 
Other analyses underline the importance of GVCs in ‘spreading’ the crisis to ever more 
countries: however, results differ in terms of the length, sign (positive or negative) and 
importance of that effect. Moreover, there are studies, which found that GVCs played a 
stabilising role concerning trade flows during the crisis. As for the relative importance of 
GVCs among the factors contributing to the trade decline, an analysis conducted by the 
OECD (Cheung and Guichard, 2009) showed that demand factors and tight credit conditions 
were the main causes of the fall in world trade during the crisis years. The unexplained part 
of the trade decline, which represented about 10–20 per cent of the total fall, may reflect a 
breakdown in GVCs. Similarly, Escaith et al. (2010) use historical data and also show that 
GVCs played a role in explaining the larger decrease in trade than in GDP. They present two 
GVC-related factors in that respect. The first is the composition effect: ‘the initial demand 
shocks linked to the credit crunch concentrated disproportionally on consumer durables and 
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investment goods, the most vertically integrated industrial sectors’ (Escaith et al., 2010, p. 
110). The second factor is called the ‘bullwhip effect’, which refers to inventory adjustments, 
the size of which becomes ever greater the further along the value chain one goes.  
Shortage of trade finance has already been shown to have played a role in the 
decline of foreign trade. Milberg and Winkler (2010) applied a more nuanced approach to the 
problem of trade finance and linked this to GVCs. They showed that trade finance shortages 
have a greater effect on international trade if it is organised in GVCs, because the close 
relationships between the participating companies result in a quick transmission of the 
problem along the value chain.  
Sectoral differences however, may be important. For example Stehrer et al. (2011a) 
analyse trade in intermediates and (separately) trade in parts and components, in order to 
show whether the breaking up of GVCs played any role in the trade decline during the crisis 
years. They use CN (Combined Nomenclature) categories at a disaggregated level. First, 
they show how the elasticity of trade with respect to income increased in the OECD 
countries, comparing the two periods of 1961–84 and 1985–2009. They explain that this is at 
least partly driven by the increased vertical specialisation of countries, i.e. the presence of 
GVCs, as countries export and import a large amount of parts and components and other 
intermediate products (‘intermediates’ being parts and components plus semi-finished goods 
plus primary goods). The increased income elasticity of trade is then explained by the fact 
that trade flows are registered as gross (i.e. the full amounts), whereas GDP relies on the 
concept of value added (a kind of net value). During the crisis, in real terms they found a 
slight decline in the share of parts and components in total trade for the EU-27. They showed 
industry differences: on the one hand, the share of parts and components as a measure of 
the degree of vertical specialisation varied considerably, with electrical machinery, machinery 
and equipment, transport equipment and the automotive sector having the highest shares; on 
the other hand, industrial differences were also present in the extent of the decline in export 
and import volumes during the crisis. In this latter respect, the automotive sector stands out; 
other sectors that are less ‘GVC intensive’ on the basis of the trade shares of parts and 
components also experienced a large fall. According to the authors, the trade fall may be an 
outcome of demand and supply-side factors, disruptions in GVCs being one of the many 
causes.   
On the other hand, certain studies underline the stabilising impact of GVCs in terms 
of sustaining of trade levels or at least moderating the fall in trade flows. Thus, seemingly 
unrelated to our topic, Alfaro and Chen (2010) analyse the reaction and role of FDI during the 
global financial crisis. They examine firm-level data from more than 100 countries for 2007 
and 2009. Their results can be related to the GVC approach, because they distinguish and 
examine three channels through which FDI impacts upon the performance of companies: 
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production linkages, financial linkages and multinational networks. From our point of view, 
the most important results are that multinationals engaged in activities with vertical 
production linkages weathered the crisis better than their local counterparts. On the other 
hand, horizontal type of FDI was affected more negatively. Moreover, companies operating 
as part of a multinational network on average performed better; here again, horizontal 
production linkages were affected more negatively than vertically integrated ones. Thus 
GVCs may have played a stabilising role. Van Bergeijk (2013) analysed trade data for 42 
countries, and found that international value chains had a major diminishing impact 
concerning the fall in world trade during 2008-9. 
Behrens et al. (2011) found, in the case of Belgium, that involvement in global value 
chains has some explanatory power for the fall in both exports and imports during the crisis, 
though domestic operations were equally affected. According to their results, the trade fall 
was mainly caused by demand-side factors. They also point out that the fall in foreign trade 
is explained overwhelmingly by the intensive margin of trade (exporters reduced the volume 
of exports), while the extensive margin (i.e. reduction in the number of exporters) was 
negligible. This is in line with the findings of Békés et al. (2012), who analysed firm survey 
data from seven countries (Austria, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Spain and the United 
Kingdom). They also found that ‘networking’ and links with other companies (outsourcing or 
controlling other companies) helped firms to fare better during the crisis. This result can also 
be interpreted within the GVC framework. On the other hand, companies controlled by other 
firms were in a worse position. Thus the place of the firm in the production chain is an 
important determinant of the effect of the crisis. Case study evidence in the apparel sector 
presented by Gereffi and Frederick (2010:186) also showed that involvement in GVCs could 
have played a mitigating effect during the crisis – as when for example lead firms supported 
suppliers who were suffering from trade finance problems. 
Bems et al. (2011) use a global input-output framework containing data from 55 
countries. They found that GVCs (proxied by trade in intermediates) significantly mitigated 
the fall in world trade, as the extent of the decline in trade in intermediaries was less than half 
the fall in trade in final goods. They also used the concept of vertical specialisation – thus a 
subset of trade in intermediates – for their further investigations. Like Stehrer et al. (2011a), 
they distinguished between gross trade and value-added trade, and found that value-added 
trade decreased less than gross trade, which meant that vertical specialisation contributed 
(albeit modestly) to the greater decrease in total trade.  
The two seemingly opposing results (that GVCs played an important role in the trade 
fall and that GVCs acted as stabilizers for trade flows) are reconciled to some extent by a 
dynamic analysis of Altomonte et al. (2012), who use transaction-level French trade data, 
matched with ownership data for 2007–09, to determine whether GVCs contributed to the 
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significant fall in international trade flows during the crisis. They found that trade in 
intermediaries was the most important cause of the decrease in foreign trade flows; thus the 
role of GVCs was substantial in the trade decrease during the crisis. However, they also 
found that this type of trade rebounded faster – i.e. ‘trade originated within hierarchies of 
firms reacted faster to the negative demand shock, but has also recovered faster in the 
following months than arm’s length trade’ (Altomonte et al., 2012, p. 23). They also show the 
presence of the ‘bullwhip effect’ of inventory adjustment.  
As for the research question whether the crisis brought about changes in the level, 
extent and other characteristics of the participation of advanced economies in GVCs, the 
crisis-related shifts in GVCs are connected to the changes in their drivers. According to 
World Economic Forum (2012), these drivers are increased energy and transport costs, 
which reduce the length of GVCs; the emergence of new players, who secure access to 
resources, causing a surge in competition; the possibly changing role of China with the shifts 
in its growth models; further decrease in information technology costs and the changing 
global map of economic growth. It is important to note however, that as Cameron (2011) 
points out, while theories are abundant, there is ‘little systematic empirical work on the 
drivers of the growth of global value chains’ (p. 92) However, the report of the World 
Economic Forum (2012) found it likely that the global geography of GVCs would change 
towards a larger role of developing countries. Accetturo et al. (2011) also shows that for an 
increasing number of firms in advanced countries, outsourcing or offshoring will be an 
obliged decision in the post-crisis era.  
The connection between the crisis and GVCs is analysed from a development and 
developing-country perspective by the papers collected in the book by Cattaneo et al. 
(2010b). While this volume concentrates on developing countries, the analysis provides 
important indirect insights into the changing position of advanced countries in the analysed 
field. One of the main conclusions of the book is that GVCs proved to be resilient to the 
crisis; they became (and remain) important actors in the world economy and important 
modes of organisation for the production process in certain activities. Moreover, they call 
attention to the (possibly) longer-term impacts of the crisis on world trade – above all, its 
diversification in terms of a shift from the advanced countries to the South, not only in supply 
but also in demand. A second long-term effect is the trend towards consolidation at the 
country and company levels. This means, at the country level, a shift towards large 
developing countries, especially China; at the company level it signifies an ever more 
pronounced preference on the part of lead firms for larger, more competitive and productive 
first-tier suppliers, which are able to operate globally. The report of the World Economic 
Forum (2012) also concentrates on the implications for developing countries. Their 
conclusions for advanced countries’ economic policy are that because of the very likely shift 
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in the geography of GVCs, developed countries will be more and more concerned about 
retaining jobs parallel with the advancement and increased role of developing countries in 
GVCs. 
In summing up the empirical literature written up to now on the role of GVCs in the 
crisis, the results are at best ambiguous. This can be attributed partly to the different 
approaches and different methodologies, datasets and time horizons used. However, it 
seems obvious that, on the one hand, GVCs played a role in transmitting the crisis and had 
an amplifying effect in the first few months of it in terms of the decrease in international trade. 
On the other hand, they also had a certain stabilising effect, at least in the slightly longer run. 
This may have been caused by the reversal of the bullwhip effect, as well as by the fact that 
companies inside the value chain helped each other (e.g. by providing trade finance) or tried 
to start to rebuild the network, which operated before the crisis. 
As for the changing role of GVCs as a result of the crisis, it is clear that GVCs are 
here to stay; but consolidation tendencies in them are ubiquitous. As Godart et al. (2009, p. 
7) underline: “sunk costs matter”, thus the rebuilding of the pre-crisis production networks 
and GVCs may take considerable time and may involve different players at certain levels of 
the GVCs, which may affect the relative level and extent of participation of advanced 
countries in them. On the basis of the surveyed studies it is all the more probable that in the 
era of increasing competitive pressures, companies in advanced economies are less and 
less able to retain less skilled activities, which are increasingly relocated to developing and 
emerging economies. On the other hand, actors in advanced economies are increasingly 
specialised in activities at the two sides of value chains, resulting in a higher value capture 
for them.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper reviewed the current literature on advanced economies' activity specialisation 
after "globalisation's second unbundling" and on the impact of the crisis on GVCs. We 
addressed two related perspectives: globalisation- and crisis-related changes in global value 
chains – in order to make predictions with respect to the ways these countries' activity 
specialisation is bound to evolve. 
One lesson that can be learned from the literature reviewed in this paper is that the 
unbundling of business functions prompted advanced economy actors’ activity specialisation 
within GVCs to shift to the sides: both to the left and – even more – to the right side of the 
smile curve. Crisis and the ensuing geographic and organisational consolidation of GVCs 
have accelerated this ongoing tendency. The consequence for advanced countries is a 
14 
 
stronger specialisation on the activities requiring higher skills at the two ends of the GVC, 
while the reliance on less advanced countries with lower wages in the “middle” of the GVCs 
has grown more robust. Changes in the international division of labour will without doubt 
have  welfare consequences, which is a topic for future research. Moreover, country-level 
specialisation on GVC and non-GVC sectors determines the manoeuvring room of national 
economic policies, which is also to be addressed.   
It is important to emphasize again that while the theoretical framework for analysing 
GVCs is strong; our concrete knowledge about them and their role in the national economies 
is relatively limited. This is mainly due to the inability of available data to capture and 
characterise the phenomenon and the difficult, lengthy and meticulous task of compiling 
more adequate sets of data, in spite of all the efforts that have been made in that field of 
research – as it is shown in the article. That is why on one hand, as an international exercise, 
the initiative of the OECD-WTO to measure trade in value-addediv is an important step 
towards helping to improve our understanding of the GVCs. On the other hand, obviously, 
more sector, country and company case studies would be needed. GVC research is without 
doubt yet an unfinished business. 
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http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php/International_sourcing_statistics 
ii
 According to Rammer at al. (2011: p. 43), the share of LMT industries in total manufacturing value 
added was 73% in several EU countries in 2007.   
iii
 In Piekkola’s approach organisational capital includes not only the organisational design and 
business model related intangible assets but customer-related intangibles as well, such as brands 
trademarks, distribution channels, etc. 
iv
 See e.g. http://www.oecd.org/sti/industryandglobalisation/measuringtradeinvalue-addedanoecd-
wtojointinitiative.htm or about its use http://www.voxeu.org/article/new-world-input-output-database 
and the references therein. 
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